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Abstract Biobanks, collecting human specimen, medical records, and lifestyle-
related data, face the challenge of having contradictory missions: on the one hand
serving the collective welfare through easy access for medical research, on the other
hand adhering to restrictive privacy expectations of people in order to maintain their
willingness to participate in such research. In this article, ethical frameworks
stressing the societal value of low-privacy expectations in order to secure bio-
medical research are discussed. It will turn out that neither utilitarian nor com-
munitarian or classical libertarian ethics frameworks will help to serve both goals.
Instead, John Rawls’ differentiation of the ‘‘right’’ and the ‘‘good’’ is presented in
order to illustrate the possibility of ‘‘serving two masters’’: individual interests of
privacy, and societal interests of scientiﬁc progress and intergenerational justice. In
order to illustrate this counterbalancing concept with an example, the ﬁve-pillar
concept of the German Ethics Council will be brieﬂy discussed.
Zusammenfassung Biobanken, die Ko ¨rperproben, Krankenakten und lebens-
stilrelevante Angaben miteinander verknu ¨pft aufbewahren, mu ¨ssen zwei sich aus-
schließende Ziele verfolgen: Zum einen soll die o ¨ffentliche Wohlfahrt mittels
mo ¨glichst schrankenlosem Zugang fu ¨r die medizinische Forschung gesteigert
werden, zum anderen mu ¨ssen die restriktiven Einstellungen von Ko ¨rperprobenspen-
dern gegenu ¨ber der Privatspha ¨re respektiert werden, um deren Bereitschaft zur
Studienteilnahme zu erhalten. Im folgenden Artikel werden neuere bioethische
Entwu ¨rfe kritisch beleuchtet, die den sozialen Wert geringer Privatspha ¨renerwart-
ungen betonen. Es stellt sich dabei heraus, dass weder utilitaristische, noch
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Zielen gerecht werden ko ¨nnen. Stattdessen wird aufgezeigt, dass John Rawls Dif-
ferenzierung von dem ,,Guten‘‘ und dem ,,Rechten‘‘ genau dies leisten kann: sowohl
dem gesellschaftlichen Interesse an wissenschaftlichem Fortschritt und Gene-
rationengerechtigkeit als auch dem individuellen Privatspha ¨reninteresse entsprechen
zu ko ¨nnen. Die Tragfa ¨higkeit dieser Differenzierung wird abschließend an dem
Beispiel des Fu ¨nf-Sa ¨ulen-Konzepts des Deutschen Ethikrats illustriert.
1 Agents of change
In the course of advancing genomic research, not merely critical opinions have been
raised, which regard the potential of this scientiﬁc endeavor with skepticism, but
rather statements, which are also directed in the opposite direction and express
dissatisfaction with research restrictions, which offer a conditional understanding of
autonomy and privacy as well. Accordingly, they demand to dissolve the current
privacy regimes, which were derived from the Hippocratic Ethic and informed
consent, and to adapt them to new development. For example, it is thus advised to
relax the conﬁdentiality obligation of a doctor, in order to enable researchers, who
are not bound by any mutual trust toward the patient, to have direct access to
physical specimens and sensible medical data (Lunshof et al. 2008a). Thereby it is
often reasoned that not merely the private sphere of patients or specimens require
protection, since they are essential for a self-determined life, but rather medical
progress must also be protected to the same degree as a globally public good
(Knoppers and Fecteau 2003). Without a signiﬁcant increase in the participation of
patients and their specimens in genomic-based research, developments in the
discipline of biomedicine will not be satisfactorily achieved in the future (Harris
2005; Schaefer et al. 2009; Herrera 2003). Since the protection of the private sphere
and impetus toward progress cannot be reconciled with each other by implication,
but rather must be counterbalanced, among others, Ruth Chadwick proposed a
further development of ethical standards that is appropriate to scientiﬁc advance-
ment, which would lead to fewer restrictions. This is what she proposed:
As we hold the view that ethical thinking evolves alongside science, we argue
that new models are needed to offer robust moral guidance while keeping the
reality of a dynamic science in mind. (Lunshof et al. 2008b:406)
It seems obvious that complex clinical diseases could be better investigated and
subsequently more effectively treated if personnel who are authorized to access data
and physical specimens would be expanded. However, whether a relaxation of the
Hippocratic Ethic must accompany this, so that conﬁdentiality obligations and
thereby respect for private spheres as basic prerequisites of an autonomous life
would have to relinquished in the future, certainly requires further discussion.
The underlying basic conﬂict here between individual freedom and collective
welfare permits different solutions. To begin with, two basic concepts will be
presented in the following: One is utilitarian solutions, which broadly takes aim to
achieve the greatest possible beneﬁt for the largest possible number of people; the
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individuals in the collective, from whom it is to be determined. In each case, at the
conclusion of the delineation of these positions, inquiries regarding these
conceptions will be named from a liberal viewpoint on one hand that insist upon
the value of freedom as the basis of individual beneﬁt; on the other hand that take
into account questions of justice and thus keep an eye on the total societal beneﬁt.
Finally, a procedural approach will be presented, the so-called 5-pillar model of the
German Ethics Council, which is intended to guarantee the named values and
criteria in practice.
2 Utilitarians and the duty of research participation
Since many years ago, arguments have been put forward from several utilitarian
thinkers, who sought to enforce the participation in medical experiments as a moral
or even legal obligation. The respective justiﬁcations vary as well as the respective
proscribed degree of obligation, so that in the following discussion, the respective
positions will be presented in the sequence of an increasing degree of obligation.
At ﬁrst, the bioethicist John Harris is mentioned, who represents in a dual manner
the obligation for participation in biomedical research (Harris 2005). At ﬁrst he
indicates that there exists a generally accepted moral obligation not to injure other
living creatures. This culminates in the obligation to participation in research since
an international abstinence would thereby injure people in that it enables diseases to
persist, which could be prevented or minimized through a broadly based
participation in medical research. On the other hand, the participation in medical
investigations is a commandment of fairness in that everyone has beneﬁted in one
form or another from the results of earlier times. Accordingly, on the basis of
reciprocity, everyone has the obligation to act for the beneﬁt of future generations.
Non-participation can be compared with unfair freeloading, since one realizes the
beneﬁts of previous research, but one abdicates responsibility for the beneﬁt of
others or for current research. In this connection, Paragraph 5 of the Helsinki
Declaration in the version of 2000 caused some irritation which evaluated the
beneﬁt of the individual higher than the value of the collective.
1 Thereby it was
assumed that everyone knew best for himself what is conducive to his beneﬁt. But
Harris disputes exactly this point and he refers to the behavior of smoking, drug
abuse, and selﬂess altruism, which are enjoyed against one’s own best interest.
Thus, one should not place the collective interest above that of the individual only
on the basis of a new balance, but rather also assume that participation in a study
can also be of interest of the participants, even if they are not always convinced of it.
Above all, there are many examples, such as the general stipulation to wear safety
belts, pay taxes, and attend school, whereby collective and individual interests are
1 In the latest version of the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association 2008) the respective
paragraph has changed only marginally. The individual welfare is not explicitly prioritised anymore over
the interests of science or society. However, it is still generally mentioned that the wellbeing of the
research subject stands above all other interests.
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individual objections (Harris 2005).
While the bioethicist John Harris derived a moral obligation to participate in
studies from the human obligation for assistance and a necessary intergenerational
justice, G. Owen Schaefer, Ezekiel J. Emanuel, and Alan Wertheimer argued from
an economical viewpoint. The three researchers, who accompany the work of the
largest, global research hospital in the USA from a bioethical perspective, advocate
the deﬁnition of biomedical research as a public resource. They state that the non-
participation in medical research is recognizable as ethical, while the participants
undergo a moral veriﬁcation, whether they are aware of the personal risks and
burdens (Schaefer et al. 2009). Similar to John Harris, Schaefer et al. make the effort
to reverse the burden of proof and court the moral value as much as possible that
those who refuse to participate in research must justify themselves. Thereto, they
consult a generally accepted deﬁnition of a public good in economics, which they
regard to be generated by biomedical research: On one hand, it is something that
does not lose its value through usage by other persons. On the other hand, it is
something that is practically impossible to prevent its usage by other people.
Conversely, a good is then private, if its value has been diminished through its usage
by another person, or it is realistically possible to limit its usage to certain people
and exclude others from using it. Thereby it is not relevant in their view, whether a
public good has been produced privately or publicly, but rather who ﬁnally beneﬁts
from it. However, the problem is that there is practically no incentive to generate
public goods normally, even if the individual usage is greater than the individual
effort. Also nobody can be excluded from a public good, because the individual
contribution thereto does not matter; this usually leads to the fact that the general
public remains underprovided with public goods. Biomedical research stands
exactly before this dilemma and it therefore demands more engagement of citizens.
Thus, Schaefer et al. propose in fact no general legal obligation for participation in
studies, but a moral prima facie obligation: It is expected from everyone to
participate in studies, in order to assist the development of the public good of
biomedical knowledge, which contributes to the public good of general health
provision. Only those who can demonstrate convincing reasons can be excused from
the moral obligation and refuse participation (Schaefer et al. 2009).
However, critics of this position indicate that in addition to more study
participants, an increase in the participation of doctors is also needed, who generally
are reticent to participate on the basis of their work load (Greene et al. 2009).
Furthermore, the values that are generated are partially questionable, since not every
study is clinically or societal culturally relevant (Katz 2009; Folayan et al. 2009).
Also, a basic health provision that is not open to everyone in several countries may
not require the participation of everyone on the basis of justice. Furthermore,
employers should make their employees available for participation, in that
otherwise sensitive wage reductions will occur for those with a low income; no
one would accept this. Minorities, who have had bad experiences in the past with
medical research and who continue to talk about them, must be informed about
current protective measures, which are also bestowed upon them. Biomedical
companies should attend more to the beneﬁts for participants, for example, in the
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recruitment would work better (Powell et al. 2009). Thus, on the basis of multiple
obstacles, it can no longer be claimed that the deﬁcient expansion of biomedical
research is mainly caused by a fundamentally distinctive antipathy to participation.
A much higher degree of obligation is represented by the research ethicist C.D.
Herrera. While the social philosopher Michael Walzer relies on the intuition of the
average citizen for moral obligations, which would render public coercion obsolete
for individual good deeds for the general public (Walzer 1983), by contrast, the
research ethicist Herrera emphasizes the principle of universal obligation of
everyone in a civil society, precisely that one cannot rely solely on an ethic of social
obligation, but rather the principle must also be legally safeguarded. Even if an
implementation of participation incentives should not be waived, ignorance of
social obligations can be punished. Approved methods, such as the informed
consent, could continue to be used, in order to maintain leeway within a system of
obligation. Thereby one would not merely comply with justice, but also with the
pursuit of autonomy (Herrera 2003).
In order to place the questions in perspective, whether the protection of
individual autonomy or rather the development of collective beneﬁts should be the
guideline of the decision to participate, apart from all interesting, academic special
debates, legal standards must be observed in pluralistic societies. With regard to this
challenge, John Rawls introduced the central differentiation between ‘‘just’’ and
‘‘good’’ (Rawls 1988).
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare
of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason, justice denies that the
loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It
does not allow that the sacriﬁces imposed on a few are outweighed by the
larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore, in a just society, the
liberties of equal citizenship are taken settled; the rights secured by justice are
not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. (Rawls
2005:3–4)
Thus, Rawls argues that societal culturally a common consensus can never be
postulated over worthwhile goals and preferences of lifestyle. But since a peaceful
coexistence in spite of different concepts and goals must be possible, at least an
‘‘overlapping consensus’’ (Rawls 1987) can be sought, which must be implemented,
beginning with the framework of a basic law up to pragmatic, individual, statutory
standards. Within this citizens then achieve certiﬁed rights. The ‘‘good’’ has indeed
a high motivational power for the individual, but it may be linked to individual
preferences and philosophies that are not shared by all citizens; therefore in doubt, it
may have a disadvantage, with respect to their legal enforcement. What is decisive
is thus that the ‘‘good’’ can only be enforced under the rule of law, provided it does
not interfere with the current legal concepts.
A legal obligation for participation in medical research may only be implemented
if it can achieve a veriﬁable and foreseeable very high ‘‘good’’ and prevents injury
to the human population. Where this does not apply, it should be questioned
critically, whether an obligation to participate exists in the sense of Schaefer et al.,
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corresponds to a concept of good (individual) life and the pursuit of important,
collective interests, especially since it turns a legal-cultural standard on its head,
since the burden of proof lies with the participant holdout and no longer with the
person who is demanding the participation. Ultimately, medical research is not
dispensed by the legal-theoretical principle, which permits the freedom of a person
(may he be the researcher himself or the invalid who is hoping for a cure) to only go
so far that he does not limit the freedom of another person, here in the image of the
participant. In this respect, the reverse of the burden of proof that is propagated by
Schaefer et al. must be rejected as long as it does not correspond to the concepts that
were achieved in overlapping consensus.
3 Communitarians versus Libertarians
Until now it is evident that utilitarian considerations orient themselves on the
collective beneﬁt as ‘‘good’’, without thereby intrinsically assuming elementary
standards of justice. This applies especially to the utilitarian reverse of the current
burden of proof, which demands a justiﬁcation obligation from those who require
participation in the research, but who misalign this obligation to those who do not
wish to make their data and specimens available to biomedical research. In this
section, it is intended to demonstrate why communitarian requirements toward the
limitation of the personal private sphere should also be observed critically.
Bartha M. Knoppers and Ruth Chadwick postulated that the technological
advance in medical research to date has permitted successfully practiced ethical
principles such as autonomy, privacy, justice, quality, and equity to now appear to
be outmoded. This trend posed a challenge to bioethics to include other, up to now,
ignored ethical criteria. Knoppers and Chadwick determined that a new form or a
new understanding of reciprocity is being established in human genetic research,
which assumes the requirements of researchers as well as the requirements of the
donors of physical specimens and personal data. Thus, not only more recognition for
participation in human genetic studies was achieved, but rather diverse, compre-
hensive participation agreements were presented, which not only could address
augmented preferences for individual participation, but rather permit the researcher
more possibilities to use the specimens for various purposes. Furthermore, it is
emphasized that mutuality is also a value that must be considered, since families
demonstrate a common genetic pool; upon discovery of life-threatening genetic
factors, relatives should not be left in ignorance about shared genes that are co-
responsible causes of illnesses. In addition, it must be considered that genetic
information can be understood not as individual but rather as collective ‘‘good’’ of
the family.
Against the background of this interpretation of the profound interwoven status
of the individual in social and especially familial relationships, Knoppers and
Chadwick ask the question whether a social obligation does not exist to demonstrate
responsibility and to make his own data available to general medical research in
solidarity with (potential) invalids. In addition, the question is asked of the general
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viewpoint, but rather either from a perspective of an entire technical discipline, an
interest group, or even simply from the viewpoint that is represented by the whole
society and therefore would be related to positions that clearly exceed the individual
limits of interest groups. Finally, both indicate the principle of universality that a
general obligation is derived from the commonality of genetic material of all
humans to treat the weakness of genetic material constructively, not least through
participation in studies which serve all of mankind (Knoppers and Chadwick 2005).
The trend that was identiﬁed and supported by Knoppers and Chadwick away
from rather individual-oriented ethical principles, such as autonomy, privacy,
justice, quality, and equity to more collective principles, such as reciprocity,
mutuality, solidarity, citizenry, and universality can be critically analyzed with
respect to ‘‘freedom’’. In order to achieve a differentiated view, two different
understandings of freedom, presented by the political theoretician and social
philosopher Isaiah Berlin, can be used to investigate the communitarian approach
since the question of health and research, which serves it, are ultimately also
questions of freedom.
2 With his binary deﬁnition of positive and negative freedom,
he created a multi-received (Carter et al. 2007; Miller 2006) categorical
differentiation (Carter 2007), with which a complete series of freedom deﬁnitions
can be differentiated and hence those that indicate to date a heuristic value in the
question of emphasizing an individual right to privacy and the general, i.e.,
collective right to health provision. In connection with the philosopher Beate
Ro ¨ssler who differentiated informational, decisional, and local privacy (2005:9), a
further step can be taken and the differentiation of positive and negative privacy can
be extracted from the relationship of autonomy and Berlin’s deﬁnition of positive
and negative freedom. Since freedom is twofold according to Berlin and from
Ro ¨ssler’s point of view, a fundamental condition of the realization of (twofold)
freedom is autonomy; therefore, the existence of a yet to be deﬁned private space is,
in turn, de facto a prerequisite (Ro ¨ssler 2005:9–10). In the following section, one
can thus speak of negative as well as a positive private sphere. The relationship
between freedom, autonomy, and privacy was explained by Ro ¨ssler as follows:
‘‘[W]e regard privacy as valuable because we regard autonomy as valuable,
and because autonomy can only lived out in all its aspects and articulated in all
its senses with the help of the conditions of privacy and by means of rights and
claims to privacy. If the telos of freedom is conceived as being able to lead an
autonomous life, then spelling out the conditions for such an autonomous life
brings to light that civil liberties alone are not sufﬁcient for the protection of
autonomy, but that autonomy is reliant upon these civil liberties being
substantialized in rights and claims regarding the protection of privacy. A
person’s autonomy can be violated or impaired in ways that do not directly
bear upon the civil liberties themselves, and it is because of this possibility
that people are dependent in their autonomy upon the protection of privacy.’’
(Ro ¨ssler 2005:9–10)
2 As an example, it could be asked: Shall a patient be liberated from a disease, and is this person
dependent on other people who make use of their freedom to help?
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negative freedom on the one hand and positive and negative privacy on the other
hand for the sake of a critical examination with the self-designated communitarian
position of Chadwick, Knoppers et al.
Concisely worded, Isaiah Berlin deﬁned positive freedom as a freedom to
something, while negative freedom was paraphrased by him as a freedom from
something (Berlin 1990:131). The positive freedom thus signiﬁes possibilities that
arise in the sense of realizing freedom to do or become something and thereby to
self-actualize. It is derived from the need of the individual to fashion his own life
and to make decisions dependent on himself instead on external factors. Berlin
formulated:
I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish
to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes,
which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside.
I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer—deciding, not being decided for,
self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were
a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of
conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them. (Berlin
1990:131)
Applied to the context of biomedical research, positive freedom means to have
the intrinsic motivation to make one’s own DNA and medically relevant data
available to a biobank in order to minimize the morbidity and mortality of humans.
This would be an instance of positive freedom, since this decision is taken without
outside pressure and is the result of free, own decision. Additionally, the personal,
private portion is not hidden, but rather implemented for the beneﬁt of many in
public, similar to utilization of political, positive freedom, introducing one’s self
into public discourse, and the possibility of being able to utilize democratization or
self-government.
3 However, it appears problematic that a volunteer would deposit
parts or substances of his own body in biobanks, if he could not determine their
application, in any case not in their entirety and at all times. This would be
equivalent to a limitation of positive freedom, because the right of self-
determination ﬁnds its limit in the content of the signed informed consent and
thus the complete self-determination is no longer given as a fundamental condition
of positive freedom. In fact this is less the case with a detailed informed consent,
where an explicit consent must be given to one concrete research and researchers
must be bound to the concrete wishes of the volunteer, but the alternative form of
broad consent and open consent or generic consent offer the researchers a broader
3 Even though the deﬁnition of negative privacy as a protected sphere against interferences and intrusions
of others aligns with Lars Ø. Ursin’s deﬁnition, our deﬁnition of positive privacy differs from his one
because the sharing of medical information under the condition of conﬁdentiality is not meant. Instead,
we argue that positive privacy describes the fact that somebody intentionally discloses valuable private
data for the beneﬁt of others even though this information loses the private status in the end. Ursin deﬁnes
a ‘‘distinction between negative privacy as the right to be left alone versus positive privacy
(conﬁdentiality) as the right to share information with someone without them passing it on.’’ (Ursin
2008:270).
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thereby can signiﬁcantly limit positive freedom.
Admittedly, Berlin had determined that the idea of positive freedom can also be
abused. In fact, different instances come into consideration that can direct one’s own
life, such as the ‘‘nature’’ of mankind, one’s own understanding, a leading idea, and
the ‘‘elevated’’ self. However, logical reasoning is usually given preference above
all else that is deﬁned as being irrational. Mankind is then broken down into a
rational, autonomous and a (to some extent) irrational, ‘‘empiric’’ heteronymous
self; both parts can be pitted against each other. The higher autonomous self must
defend himself against the lower, heterogeneous nature; the latter must be
disciplined and domesticated (Berlin 1990:132).
A problematic aspect of this splitting by Isaiah Berlin is consequently the
possibility of being able to legitimize obligations on the rational level with emphasis
on rationality which can no longer clearly be differentiated from coercion. Berlin
phrased in the following way:
This renders it easy for me to conceive of myself as coercing others for their
own sake, in their, not my, interest. I am then claiming that I know what they
truly need better than they know it themselves. (…) Once I take this view,
I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully,
oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their ‘real’ selves, in the
secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, fulﬁllment
of duty, wisdom, a just society, self-fulﬁllment) must be identical with his
freedom—the free choice of his ‘‘true’’, albeit submerged and inarticulate,
self. (Berlin 1990:133)
In a clinical scenario, this could signify that if a moment of decision-making for
or against participation in a study would cause a conﬂict between reason and moral
intuition, the doctor as well as the researcher could persist in the primacy of
rationality, be it derived from trust in communitarian values or be it derived from
self-serving motives. If the moral intuition urged a rejection, since anxiety exists in
the background about the misuse of donated DNA or data and the desire for negative
freedom would be manifested, the doctor or researcher could propagate commu-
nitarian ideals on the level of understanding, such as solidarity and universality; he
could thus promote a paradigm of positive freedom. Since in our cultural area,
reason tends to be given the advantage and it awakens the appearance of self-
evidence, it would be difﬁcult to avoid well-intentioned arguments; thus, a
dependent moment of decision would be created. This would be legitimized given
that an object of suppression, if he were only more rational and enlightened, would
exhibit a different behavior without coercion. ‘‘True motives’’ would be projected
into the person to be coerced who is allegedly merely overshadowed by an empirical
being; therefore they must be liberated through compulsory measures. An arbitrary
situation would indeed not be created, because the communitarian, ethical
framework should apply to everyone; however, the freedom of mankind would be
curtailed, as described in a special manner by John Harris and C.D. Herrera.
The oppressive situation to be feared turns out to be relevant even by inspecting
the argument of Bartha Knoppers and Ruth Chadwick. Thus, real dangers in fact
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could appear for a volunteer, which are given through ever-improved possibilities
for the interpretation of DNA, medical, and lifestyle-related data (Murray 1997).
However, they could rapidly appear as improbable individual risks by certain
interpretations of a doctor or researcher, which still appear to be acceptable with
regard to higher values such as reciprocity, mutuality, solidarity, citizenry, and
universality (Knoppers and Chadwick 2005). Those arguments permit a ‘‘reason-
able’’ person no other choice but the participation in human genome research. Thus,
it is not surprising that even Ruth Chadwick quite early posed the question, whether
at least a moral obligation to participate in human genome studies should exist, and
thereby proposed the same requirements as utilitarian bioethicists:
We also contend that the beneﬁts of research could be shared more widely by
those who proﬁt, and that there is a duty to participate in research that could
move medicine forwards on the basis of solidarity. It is questionable whether
individuals should be free, from an ethical point of view, to refuse to help in
an effort to relieve suffering for what could be regarded as trivial reasons, such
as refusing to allow samples to be reused for research on drug abuse because
of the disapproval of drug users. (…) [N]ow might be the time for a fresh
ethical perspective. (Chadwick and Berg 2001:321)
Ruth Chadwick herself indicates signiﬁcantly in a later article that was published
together with Lunshof et al. (2008b) that the private sphere is often endangered by
participating in human genome studies, but they seek simultaneously to reduce the
need to protect the private sphere, in order to eliminate the greatest possible
obstacles from scientiﬁc research.
If the private sphere is endangered, negative freedom is thus affected, which
marks an especially protected zone; according to Beate Ro ¨ssler, it represents a core
element of liberal democracies (2005:9–10). The negative freedom in the sense of
freedom from something signiﬁes accordingly the absence of limitations, coercion,
and hindrances by other people, especially by government authority (Berlin
1990:122–131):
By being free in this sense I mean not being interfered with by others. The
wider the area of non-interference the wider my freedom. (Berlin 1990:123)
Even when people strive for other values in addition to freedom, such as justice,
happiness, culture, security, and equality and would even accept relinquishing a
portion of their freedom (and if one proceeds further than Berlin and must question
more intently the material, ideal, and social conditions to enable this negative
freedom), a lower limit of personal freedom must remain protected nevertheless by
all means. Without it, people would be robbed of a nucleus, which empowers the
development of those capabilities that they need for the achievement of their own
goal. Therefore, a clear limit is absolutely necessary between the area of private life
and that of public authority (Berlin 1990:123–124). With a reference to John Stuart
Mill, he reminds us that there can be no progress without a private place of leisure:
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themselves’, civilization cannot advance; the truth will not, for lack of a free
market in ideas, come to light; there will be no scope for spontaneity,
originality, genius, for mental energy, for moral courage. Society will be
crushed by the weight of ‘collective mediocrity’. Whatever is rich and
diversiﬁed will be crushed by the weight of custom, by men’s constant
tendency to conformity, which breeds only ‘withered capacities’, ‘pinched and
hidebound’, ‘cramped and warped’ human beings. (…) ‘All the errors which a
man is likely to commit against advice and warning are far outweighed by the
evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem is good.’ (Berlin
1990:127)
Transposed onto the handling of the private sphere in biobanks, negative freedom
means that the DNA, which is stored in combination with phenotypic relevant data,
can (but not must) lead to stigmatization and discrimination, on the basis of an
unauthorized or undesired evaluation (Lemke and Lohkamp 2005), and therefore, a
protection requirement normally exists for DNA donors. This protection require-
ment can also be designated as a negative private sphere and thus creates a heuristic
tool, in order to be able to differentiate between voluntary participation and the need
for protection; however, this leads to a dichotomy which should be resolved in the
following section.
4 Ethical gradualism versus dichotomies
In the consideration of individual and collective interests, after a critical review of
approaches from communitarians, pragmatic utilitarians, and liberals, it is
recommended to avoid dichotomy determinations and one-sidedness and thereby
to revert to an ethical individualism, which is appropriate to the complexity of the
material and which accommodates the multiple interests in equal measure. Before
the background of Rawls’ theory of justice, a solution is offered to strengthen the
positive freedom in an ethical manner and thereby to promote the ‘‘good’’, but
nevertheless to set a limit in the sense of negative freedom, as long as
communitarian ideals do not include the legal overlapping consensus in a pluralistic
society. Thus, such a restraint would fulﬁll Paul Ricoeur’s dictum that the goal of
human ethical practice is ‘‘aiming at the ‘good life’ with and for others in just
institutions.’’ (Ricoeur 1992:172)
As an instrument of ethical gradual differentiation of privacy regimes, Niklas
Luhmann‘s investigation of temporal, factual, and social dimensions of human
communication is suitable (Luhmann 1997). Every potential candidate of a clinical
study would accordingly stand in a relationship to the researcher, the biobank as
well as to society, of which he is a part. The factual dimension would be to question,
e.g., to which research purpose the participation will lead, besides the temporal
dimension, which amount of time the study will claim, in addition, the social
dimension, which asks about the social consequences, such as the personal gain for
one’s own health, but also retains the theoretical possible negative social outcome
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asked whether a clinical study, which invites participation, fulﬁlls the criteria of
effectiveness and efﬁciency as well as the beneﬁt of the entire societal culture in the
form of cost reduction as well as improvement in diagnosis, and therapy appears to
be quite feasible (Wilson and Jungner 1968; Dabrock 2008). Especially signiﬁcant
for a gradual ethical consideration would be the social dimension, since in the case
of genome research, it requires special, if not exclusive, risks versus other bio- or
social markers, which could become concrete in stigmatization and discrimination
with regard to partner selection, family planning, career decisions, and insurance
coverage; hence, they require a specially intensive consideration (McNally et al.
2004). Such risks that are dependent on the design of the study but also from the
scope of the authority to access data must then be carefully weighed with regard to
human dignity which grants every person protection and respect, independent from
his given or not given characteristics simply qua personhood (Dabrock et al. 2004),
but also from the background of several European laws and guidelines like the EU
Data Protection Directive (European Parliament, Council of the EU 1995), the
European Anti-Discrimination Directive (Council of Europe 2000), the European
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Council of Europe 1997), the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (Council of Europe 2010), and diverse international biotechnology
regulation recommendations (e.g. OECD 2009). Accordingly, if the potential of
stigmatization and discrimination is minimal, e.g., the risk is minimal that one’s
own autonomy will become limited, then lower standards are necessary and
participation in the study would be morally desirable. However, such a moral
desirability is not identical with a legal obligation. The former achieves the
legitimization to support the participation in the study.
In order to motivate people to make their DNA available in the sense of positive
privacy for the good of the entire society, incentives should therefore be set on the
social level in different functional systems, for example, through an active turbo-
charging of ethical preferred practices with positive connotations. Thus, for
example, the DNA donations could be anchored in the social consciousness similar
to blood donations as praise-worthy and thus attractive in the realm of civil society
engagement. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to ponder the act of participation
not as research promotion, but rather to deﬁne it as one’s own research performance,
in order to extend the social reputation of the scientists to the donors and thus to
increase the attractiveness of participation. Thereby the juristic instrument would
remain idle, in certain cases even unnecessary, since ﬂuent changeovers from good
to rights are happening sometimes. Only it must not be forgotten to continue to
propagate the ideal of the good, since the society is ultimately dependent on it, in
order to thus conceptually fortify its understanding of right with the good and to rely
on their motivational power (Dabrock 2006). An understanding can be established
therewith, which seeks viable visions, which integrate solidarity, reciprocity, and
additional principles of personal responsibility for others, without hence objecting to
a risk, to endanger individual freedom and to achieve a type of health obligation for
everyone. Hence, it is permissible to promote a positive freedom on the fundament
of considering negative freedom, which does not regard individual and collective
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to court personal engagement in research, it should be promoted, instead of creating
moral or even legal pressure. Good reasons, which can create the appropriate
discernment, do in fact exist. They do not inevitably take effect, but behind this
openness, the possibility and mission of human decisions are demonstrated, in other
words: human freedom.
5 Anticipating a just and good biobank regime
It has become clear that utilitarian, communitarian as well as liberal approaches lead
to one-sided measures and before the background of political liberalism in the
person of John Rawls, an ethical gradualism can offer a way out of simplistic and
dichotomic perspectives. This way out should serve the goal of supporting genome
research on the whole to the beneﬁt of individual patients as well as the public
provision of health services, but simultaneously strengthen the protection of donors
and participating patients, so that the interests of the collective as well as those of
the individuals will be satisﬁed. But how must such gradualist perspectives be
implemented and applied in a reasonable governance-perspective? A balance
between the understanding of positive and negative freedom must thereby be
established with the help of institutions so that ultimately the demands of a
relativeness of the Hippocratic Ethic that was mentioned as the onset will be
obsolete, and even result in the opposite, and nevertheless the medical and public
health perspectives of genome research can be realized.
The opinion of the German Ethics Council for revision of biobank governance
made institutional, theoretical, and practical suggestions, in order to balance the
tension that has been mentioned. The intrinsic point of the impressive concept is that
it is not composed of a single principle, but rather by dint of the alternating support
of ﬁve dimensions—the text talks about ﬁve pillars—and suggests a procedural
approach that enables latitude for medical research as well as respects individual,
legally warranted protective standards. Thus, the ﬁve-pillar concept that was
conceived by the German Ethics Council (2010) begins with the ﬁrst pillar of an
extension of the rule of conﬁdentiality from doctors to every researcher and
employee of a biobank, who has access to physical specimens and data, including a
privilege to refuse to give evidence to the police as well as a conﬁscation
prohibition. Hence, the so-called biobank conﬁdentiality protects the personality
rights and the informational self-determination, especially versus insurance
companies, employers, and public authorities.
With the second pillar, the consent requirement is in fact retained, but
simultaneously the possibility is guaranteed to be able to select between different
degrees of agreement for research purposes. The samples and data will accordingly
be determined for an explicitly deﬁned research purpose, but they can also by
mutual agreement be released from research limitations. In this instance, the
limitation would be nulliﬁed for a single research project, a particular research
facility or the time limit of the license term. Through the biobank conﬁdentiality, it
will simultaneously be ensured that the risk of misuse of specimens and data will be
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right of withdrawal can in fact be used, in order to remove one’s own specimens and
data from the research, but simultaneously to refrain from an obligation to also
destroy the contiguous research results. The possibility should be offered, with the
consent of the donor, to be able to continue to use the research results, provided that
one’s own data may be used only aggregated and without person-related data. Thus,
the withdrawal volition of the donor as well as the concern of the researcher can be
met at the same time to continue to use the data that have been gained to date and to
render the scientiﬁc beneﬁt not wholly obsolete. The outcome thereby is that the
maturity of the donor himself to be able to determine the degree of risk to participate
is set against paternalism.
The third pillar contains an obligatory involvement of ethics commissions for
specimen and data collection without temporal and thematic limitations as well as
the obligation for periodic evaluation of proprietary activities. When this
recommendation has been implemented, it is guaranteed that ethically questionable
research projects can no longer be performed. Should research be performed with
person-related, non-anonymous specimens and data, which represent a massive
invasion of personhood rights, then the ethics commission must grant in each
instance a vote of approval prior to the performance, in order to maintain a high
protective standard of personhood rights. The potential for misuse of specimens and
data will thereby be appreciably reduced and thus the negative freedom of the donor
will be strengthened.
The fourth pillar requires a persistent responsibility of the biobank for the
security of specimens and data as of their admittance situation until their liquidation
and destruction, since the biobank transgresses the bidirectional relationship
between patient and doctor and must conduct an independent establishment of
mutual trust on an institutional level.
The ﬁfth pillar proceeds in the same direction: it requires a distinctive
transparency especially for collections without temporal and thematic limitation,
which make the storage and processing of specimens and data comprehensible at
any time and thereby can meet the control interest of donors. If the available
information is as meager as expected at the onset of such a collection, the
transparency can satisfy the ongoing need to know about the biobank’s practice.
In summation, the model of the German Ethics Council ﬁrst and foremost, in fact,
cannot and will not set any moral impulses, which propagate a certain vision of
good (or the promotion of genome-based research for the purpose of improving
public health); instead, its strength however is the concentration upon the protective
rights of the citizens, by spelling out the legal and organizational overlapping
consensus and by strengthening trust in the participating institutions (Dabrock et al.
2011). By means of this procedural manner, research freedom will be strengthened
in reality so that individual and public health can also beneﬁt from it. Moreover, it
enables an increased degree of protective rights and control possibilities, which
reduce donor inhibitions and thereby convince more people to donate specimens and
to ease previous restrictions for their usage or to dispense with them completely.
Simultaneously not only the interests of the collective will be kept in focus, but
rather the protective requirement of each individual will be strengthened as well as
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123an elevate transparency, an improved data security and a more frequent involvement
of the ethics commissions. Moreover, there remains, of course, much scope for a
plural society, to develop effective concepts of good, which include the participation
in genome research without too much pressure of moral obligations.
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